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Neither a miracle nor a disaster – President Zelensky’s first 
year in office
Tadeusz Iwański, Sławomir Matuszak, Krzysztof Nieczypor, Piotr Żochowski
20th May marked the end of Volodymyr Zelensky first year as President of Ukraine. Thanks to the clear 
victory of his Servant of the People party in the snap parliamentary election held in July 2019 and 
the establishment of the government of Oleksiy Honcharuk the following month, Zelensky swiftly 
gained full power. The plan for the declared repair of the country and an end to the war in the Donbas 
involved the appointment of apolitical specialists for key positions in the government to immediately 
process legislation in the parliament and to conduct informal diplomacy. This strategy brought about 
certain successes. Partial organisational changes were introduced in the prosecutor’s office and courts; 
the constitution was amended in the area of the rights of the members of the Verkhovna Rada and 
the president, and a meeting – the first in three years – in the Normandy Format was held in Paris. 
Already before the end of 2019 a new election law was passed, a key reform in the gas sector (the 
unbundling of Naftogaz) was completed and in March 2019, and a breakthrough law regarding the 
lifting of the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land was passed. 
However, increasing conflicts of interests inside the parliamentary group of the Servant of the People 
limited the comfort of governing the country, exposing the most important weaknesses of Zelen-
sky’s bloc: its lack of ideological cohesion, the lack of a clear action plan and, above all, the lack of 
a professional and independent staff base. The remaining powerful influence of the oligarchs on the 
state has impeded the work on important laws and Ukraine’s co-operation with the International 
Monetary Fund, which has also contributed to sustained negative phenomena in the electricity sector. 
As a result, Zelensky’s first year in office can be considered to be a time of tough learning about how 
politics, both domestic and international, functions in practice. The scope of power the president has 
gained thanks to the slogans of removing ‘old’ politicians has become a source of weakness in itself – 
the below-par effectiveness of ruling the country. It appears that Zelensky is beginning to understand 
this interdependency. He has entered his second year in office with approval rating in society still 
high (45% of support in the election survey, 57% of support in the confidence survey). Nevertheless, 
he will have to face a much more difficult economic situation due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
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The failure of a great experiment 
When taking power, Zelensky declared that he wo-
uld remain in office for one term only and that his 
goal was to carry out fast and thorough reforms. 
In the beginning, his modus operandi consisted 
in transferring draft laws from the Presidential 
Office (as the former Presidential Administration 
had now been renamed) to the parliament, in 
which Zelensky’s hastily formed Servant of the 
People party gained a majority following a snap 
election. The draft laws were immediately passed, 
often without appropriate assessment from the 
members of the parliament and in breach of the 
parliamentary regulations. The author of this 
mode, described as the ‘Turbo-Regime’, was An-
driy Bohdan, the head of the Presidential Office 
and one of Zelensky’s few aides who had expe-
rience in politics and administration. 
During the first few weeks of the work of the new 
Verkhovna Rada, a series of new laws was suc-
cessfully passed, among them the laws which had 
traction in society but which were in fact difficult 
to implement. One example is the law regarding 
the lifting of immunity of the members of the 
Verkhovna Rada and the law on the procedure 
for impeaching the president. The new election 
law, which entered into force at the beginning 
of 2020, can also be counted as one of the gre-
atest achievements of the Zelensky administration. 
Due to the new election law, the parliamentary 
and local elections will be held in a proportional 
system (many electoral districts were introduced 
to replace the nationwide district). The former 
mixed system, allowed for half of the members 
of parliament to be elected in single-member 
constituencies. This was, in the context of Ukraine, 
a source of abuse and political corruption for years. 
At the same time, an interventionist governing of 
the parliament caused a negative reaction from 
a section of Servant of the People members who 
expressed their opposition to their lack of agency. 
Former internal divisions and different groups 
of influence within the pro-presidential faction 
also resurfaced, in particular with members of 
the parliament affiliated to the oligarch Ihor Ko-
lomoysky. Even though Zelensky’s relations with 
Kolomoysky did not turn into an open conflict 
(see below), they have deteriorated. The oligarch 
blocked the work on laws essential to the gover-
nment: regarding the lifting of the moratorium 
on the sale of agricultural land and the ban on 
returning banks to their former owners1.
The problems in the parliament also stemmed from 
the fact that in February 2020 Andriy Bohdan, who 
unceremoniously but effectively put together the 
president’s diverse team in the government and in 
the parliament to form one functional mechanism, 
lost his position. His successor, Andriy Yermak, 
seems to have a much poorer understanding of 
the situation in the Servant of the People party 
and in internal politics than Bohdan. As a result 
of these tensions, the president lost the initial 
control of the parliament, and the pace of passing 
laws abated. It became more difficult to secure 
a majority of the vote for important laws and an 
increasing portion of them was passed thanks to 
members from opposition or independent factions. 
Due to the model of governing with the Office of 
the President as the decision hub and the principle 
of basing the government on professionals from 
outside the realm of politics, the government has 
been reduced to the role of a contractor enacting 
the will of the president. This was the idea behind 
the appointment of Oleksiy Honcharuk as prime 
minister. He was a specialist in deregulation but 
did not have much experience in administration 
or any political support base. Even though the 
new government was composed of experts, its 
work was poorly coordinated and rather ineffec-
1 In both cases the members of parliament affiliated to Kolo-
moysky proposed several thousand amendments. The aim 
of these actions was to obstruct the legislative process. 
Due to the model of governing with 
the Office of the President as the 
decision hub and the principle of 
basing the government on profes-
sionals from outside the realm of 
politics, the government has been 
reduced to the role of a contractor 
enacting the will of the president.
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tive given the expectations of a president who 
demanded outcomes (too) fast. This has urged 
Zelensky to correct his concept of ‘new faces’ as 
a guarantee of effective reforms; it has not, howe-
ver, encouraged him to empower the government. 
All this led to the resignation of Honcharuk and 
the appointment of a new cabinet of Denys Shmy-
hal in March this year. The new prime minister 
is a seasoned manager with (brief) experience 
in the local and national administration and his 
government combines the ‘old’ with the ‘new’. 
However, in this case, the process of appoint-
ments for particular positions in the government 
was unprepared and chaotic. This is reflected in 
a shortage of qualified staff ready to work in the 
administration and Zelensky’s lack of vision of the 
directions and priorities in reforming the country. 
The rule of law – institutional 
challenges 
A lack of determination in following through on 
the reforms of the legal system and the bodies of 
law enforcement, which were launched in 2014, 
is one of the greatest problems of successive 
presidential teams. Following the first decisions 
made by President Zelensky, one might think 
that the shifts in the institutions responsible for 
fighting corruption, the legal system and the 
internal security sector would be implemented 
fast. However, this was not the case since the 
implementation of the reforms is being hampered 
by different groups of interest within the ruling 
camp. In September 2019, the Verkhovna Rada 
adopted a  law initiating a thorough reform of 
the Prosecutor General’s office, on the initiative 
of the president. It was replaced by the Office of 
the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, with Ruslan 
Riaboshapka, a proponent of firm changes, at the 
helm. The law allowed for a substantial change in 
staff (according to the information of December 
2019, 610 out of 1,083 prosecutors were vetted 
positively) and the establishment of a transparent 
system of recruitment of new staff. Organisational 
changes were also successfully implemented. The 
Prosecutor General oversees two separate bodies – 
the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office 
and the Military Prosecutor’s Office. The position 
of the chief Military Prosecutor will be scrapped 
on 1st January 2021. 
The reform was brought to a halt on 5th March 
this year when Riaboshapka was dismissed at the 
president’s motion (officially, due to a lack of re-
sults in the form of convictions passed) and Iryna 
Venediktova was appointed Prosecutor General 
of Ukraine. She is thought to be subject to to 
informal influences from politicians (a section of 
the Ukrainian media have suggested she is affilia-
ted to Interior Minister Arsen Avakov) and to be 
uninterested in reforming the Prosecutor’s General 
Office (for example, she reinstated several com-
promised prosecutors and removed international 
experts from the process of recruiting new staff). 
By unblocking additional budget funding, Zelen-
sky’s team made it possible for the State Bureau 
of Investigations to function after its activity had 
been hamstrung by President Poroshenko. The 
institution was set up in autumn 2018 and inve-
stigates crimes committed by high-ranking state 
officials and law enforcement officials (with the 
exclusion of corruption cases). However, as is the 
case in other institutions responsible for imple-
menting the rule of law, the staff policy has been 
affecting the effectiveness of the State Bureau 
of Investigations since it makes appointments of 
officials contingent on their political connections2.
The legal regulation of the functioning of the 
High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) was another 
important step. Since this court was established 
in June 2018, its work has been paralysed because 
2 At the end of December 2019, the bureau’s head, Roman 
Truba, was removed from office. He was accused of the 
lack of effective supervision of his subordinates (his deputy 
was charged with corruption). Truba was replaced with 
Venediktova and after she was moved to the Prosecutor 
General’s Office, Oleksandr Sokolov was appointed acting 
director of the State Bureau of Investigations. 
A lack of determination in following 
through on the 2014 reforms of the 
legal system and the bodies of law 
enforcement is one of the greatest 
problems of successive presidential 
teams.
OSW Commentary     NUMBER 334 4
all corruption-related cases were submitted to it, 
regardless of their importance, and this made it 
impossible to effectively conduct proceedings. 
At present, the HACC deals exclusively with the 
cases brought before it by the National Anti-
Corruption Bureau (NACB) and the Specialised 
Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, and the cases 
must concern corruption among high-ranking 
state officials. The remaining corruption cases 
are handled by the general prosecutor’s bodies. 
In autumn 2019, necessary changes were adopted 
in order to increase the effectiveness of anti-cor-
ruption measures. The legal status of corruption 
whistleblowers was regulated— whistleblowers 
who are involved in a corrupt practice and report 
it will be exempted from legal liability and those 
who report corruption will receive 10% of the 
financial resources retrieved by the state. The 
NACB was granted the right to independently 
use operational technologies (wiretapping, ob-
servation) without having to obtain assistance in 
these matters from the Security Service of Ukraine 
(SBU), which had been effectively blocked by 
former president Poroshenko’s team. Neverthe-
less, the functioning of the NACB is hampered by 
conflicts which stemed both from the ambitions 
of politicians and their fears of an independent 
institution. In September 2019, administrative 
action was taken against the head of the NACB, 
Artem Sytnyk, on the grounds of his financial of-
fence of (accepting material gains in the form of 
a free of charge stay in a resort in Ukraine). The 
incriminating material was collected by the police, 
which may indicate that the case had been inspi-
red by the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
Following this incident, a draft law regarding the 
amendment to the law on the NACB was submit-
ted to the Verkhovna Rada; it would make it easier 
to dismiss its director (the regulations in force rule 
out the dismissal of the director on the grounds of 
administrative wrongdoings). The matter sparked 
controversy in the international arena. In May this 
year, the International Monetary Fund and the G-7 
warned Kyiv that the amendments to the law on 
the NACB might trigger a revision of the fund’s 
financial policy towards Ukraine. 
The unfinished reform of the Security Service of 
Ukraine (SBU) remains a burden for Zelensky’s 
team. Since 2014 the planned changes to the 
institution have been delayed due to internal 
resistance from its staff and the reluctance of 
successive Ukrainian presidents towards an exces-
sively radical limitation of the competences of this 
service which is subordinate to them. According 
to the premises of the reform, the SBU is set to 
become a counterintelligence service deprived 
of the functions to investigate economic crimes. 
This type of crime would be entirely transferred 
to a new body whose establishment is being 
planned – the Financial Investigation Service. On 
the other hand, the intensified activity against the 
Russian intelligence services should be deemed 
a positive manifestation of the SBU’s work. Over 
the last year the SBU has become clearly more 
active in this area. The condition of the Ukrainian 
intelligence services remains an open question. 
A high rate of turnover in managerial positions 
proves that the Foreign Intelligence Service and 
the military Main Directorate of Intelligence have 
sustained difficulties in adjusting to new opera-
tional challenges. 
The economy: from ambitious plans 
to crisis management 
In line with the constitution, the president does 
not have competences in economic issues, which 
lie within the remit of the government. However, 
in a situation in which Zelensky has concentra-
ted full power, he has taken the responsibility 
for economic policy. The Presidential Office has 
found candidates for ministers in the economic 
sector of the government and Zelensky has had 
a casting vote in their approval. 
During the electoral campaign Zelensky avoided 
any specific points, limiting his statements to 
promises of fundamental changes in the economy 
and general prosperity (with the slogan: ‘An end 
The legal regulation of the func-
tioning of the High Anti-Corruption 
Court (HACC) can be considered 
a success.
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of the era of poverty’). After the parliamentary 
election, the Verkhovna Rada swiftly adopted 
a series of laws which had been blocked in the 
term of the previous parliament, among them: 
the deregulation law (including the revoking of 
many regulations which had been in force since 
the USSR), the law increasing transparency of 
public finance (e.g. the establishment of an online 
platform ‘E-Contact’ which makes it possible to 
monitor ongoing budget spending), and the law 
regarding concessions which makes it easier for 
foreign companies to lease state-owned facilities. 
The Honcharuk government also adopted a very 
ambitious programme of actions which forecast 
a 40% increase in Ukraine’s GDP over the next 
five years, an influx of US$ 50 billion in foreign 
investment and permission to sell agricultural 
land3. Even though a part of these assumptions 
was unrealistic from the very beginning, the do-
cument proved there was the will to carry out 
a deep reform of Ukraine’s economy. 
The government has succeeded in implementing 
several important changes, among them: the 
unbundling Naftogaz4, a five-year contract signed 
with Gazprom regarding the transit of Russian gas 
and the adopted law which lifted the moratorium 
on the sale of agricultural land, which had been 
an object of political dispute for nearly two deca-
des5. It was with difficulty that the banking law, 
which will make it more difficult to regain the 
banks nationalized in 2014-2016 by their former 
owners, was adopted. This concerns, above all, 
PrivatBank which is owned by the two oligarchs 
Ihor Kolomoysky and Hennadiy Boholyubov. This 
was the main obstacle to signing a new assistance 
programme between Kyiv and the International 
Monetary Fund and one of the examples that 
a behind-the-scenes influence of the oligarchs 
on decision-making in Ukraine has not waned. 
3 S. Matuszak, ‘Polityka gospodarcza ekipy Zełenskiego – am-
bitne zapowiedzi, niepokojące sygnały’, OSW, 30 October 
2019, www.osw.waw.pl.
4 A. Łoskot-Strachota, S. Matuszak, ‘Zakończenie procesu 
unbundlingu Naftohazu’, OSW, 15 January 2020, www.
osw.waw.pl.
5 S. Matuszak, ‘The moratorium on the sale of agricultural 
land is lifted in Ukraine’, OSW, 1 April 2019, www.osw.
waw.pl.
The recruitment choices have proved to be the 
essential weakness of Ukraine’s economic policy. 
Almost all ministries were staffed with experts 
who have very limited experience in manage-
ment. Not only was this the case with Prime Mi-
nister Honcharuk, but also with ministries such 
as the Ministry of Economic Development, Trade 
and Agriculture and the Ministry of Energy and 
Environmental Policy. Even though this is the first 
government in Ukraine which has not been accu-
sed of corruption, it quickly turned out that the 
new ministers had great difficulties in developing 
and implementing changes in the economy. This 
was particularly visible in the energy sector, where 
the measures undertaken by the government led 
to the destabilisation of the market (among other 
factors, due to the fact that imports of electricity 
from Russia were allowed) and in heavy industry, 
which remains one of vital branches of Ukraine’s 
economy. 
The poor effectiveness of the economic policy was 
one of the main reasons for the resignation of the 
Honcharuk government. However, the compo-
sition of the new government of Denys Shmyhal 
can hardly be seen as an improvement in terms of 
its professionalism. Initially, four positions in his 
government (linked with the economy), including 
that of the deputy prime minister, were left vacant, 
and certain candidacies shifted even on the day 
of voting. This can be seen as a sign of difficulty 
in finding the appropriate staff. 
The government reshuffles, which were difficult 
to understand, also continued in the following 
weeks and the need to respond to ongoing crises 
in different segments of the economy took pre-
cedence over systemic reforms. A clear example 
of the weakness of the new ministers were the 
The government has succeeded in 
implementing several important 
changes, such as the adoption of 
a law lifting the moratorium on the 
sale of agricultural land. This had 
been an object of political dispute 
for nearly two decades.
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incorrect assumptions in the section of the budget 
law regarding revenues. Combined with a high 
exchange rate of the Ukrainian hryvnia, they con-
tributed to a higher budget deficit. The problem 
intensified in the first months of 2020, meaning 
that the previous government could not be blamed 
for it. The attempts to make privatisation more 
dynamic and to improve the investment climate in 
Ukraine also failed, and this was not strictly due 
to economic issues but, above all, to corruption 
and the lack of the reform of the legal system. 
Nor were measures taken in order to deoligarchise 
(de-monopolise) Ukraine’s economy. Even though 
Zelensky has never explicitly promised this, he 
has so far tried to act as an arbiter towards the 
oligarchs. However, the increased importance 
of the role of Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine’s richest 
citizen, has been observed in recent weeks. This 
can be inferred from the fact that Olha Buslavets, 
the acting energy minister, was said to have made 
decisions which were favourable for the oligarch, 
when she was working in the ministry6. Once 
she took the position of acting energy minister, 
a change in the energy mix of the country, which 
would in fact favour Akhmetov, was announ-
ced7. It is however difficult to assess whether it 
is only a tactical alliance or Zelensky’s long-term 
attempt to find alternative support in the face of 
6 ‘Коломойский VS Ахметов. Ольга Буславец – новая 
глава Минэнерго. Что о ней известно? Досье’, Ліга.Бізнес, 
17 April 2020, biz.liga.net.
7 The change was caused by an 8% year-on-year decline in 
the demand for electricity in April this year which led to 
the need to reduce the production of energy. In the new 
energy mix, the limits in the production of energy affect-
ed electricity produced in heating plants (75% owned by 
Akhmetov) and renewable sources of energy (25% con-
trolled by Akhmetov) to a lesser extent than state-owned 
nuclear power plants.
an escalating dispute with Kolomoysky over the 
banking law.
No breakthrough in the case 
of the Donbas 
Putting an end to the war in the Donbas was one 
of Zelensky’s most important electoral slogans. 
After he took office, he successfully revived in-
ternational negotiations to end the conflict. The 
appointment of Andriy Yermak, first as an aide 
and then the head of the Presidential Office (he 
is also responsible for the peace talks) has led to 
Ukraine resuming official and non-official consul-
tations with Russia. Due to this, three stages of 
an exchange of prisoners of war were organised 
and one meeting in the Normandy Format (at the 
level of the heads of state) was held in December 
2019 in Paris. The organisation of the summit was 
facilitated by the positions held by several states 
of Western Europe which had been calling for 
a revision of the EU policy on Russia and Zelensky’s 
agreement to the Russian demand to adopt the 
Steinmeier formula that regulates the parameters 
of the future local elections in the occupied areas. 
Zelensky is seeking new initiatives which would 
allow him to break the ongoing impasse in the 
process of regulating the conflict in the Donbas. 
Some of them (such as the proposal to establish 
a Consultation Council, which would in fact legiti-
mise representatives of the separatist republics) 
have caused justified controversy not only in a part 
of Ukrainian society but also among a large group 
of the members of the pro-presidential Servant 
of the People party. They also provide an argu-
ment for Zelensky’s opponents who accuse him 
of undertaking actions with the calculated aim of 
generating short-term political gains. The first ex-
change of prisoners of war, held on 7th September 
2019, contributed to an increase in the support 
for the president by a staggering 13%8. However, 
the two subsequent ones did not produce such 
a spectacular effect. The new initiatives launched 
by Zelensky indicate he is honestly willing to deli-
8 Моніторинг суспільних настроїв українців (6-10 вересня 
2019), Рейтинг, 12 September 2019, ratinggroup.ua.
The initiatives intended to break 
the impasse over the situation in 
the Donbas have provided an argu-
ment for Zelensky’s opponents who 
accuse him of undertaking actions 
with the calculated aim of generat-
ing short-term political gains. 
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ver on his electoral promise and bring an end to 
the war. Nevertheless, they point to the fact that 
the president has not abandoned the hope that 
a breakthrough in the negotiations is possible 
without far-reaching concessions to Russia and 
without a crisis in political circles. Despite that, 
Zelensky’s efforts have brought about certain 
achievements, for example: the bridge at the 
border in Stanytsia Luhanska was rebuilt; voting 
in local elections was made possible for people 
who had been temporarily displaced; and a TV 
channel ‘Dom’ (Home) was set up to broadcast 
in areas not under Kyiv’s control. 
Outlook 
In the first year of his presidency Zelensky has 
proved to his critics that he is neither Kolomoysky’s 
puppet, which some of his opponents initially 
suggested, nor is he inclined to betray national 
interests for the sake of Russia. Several key laws 
have been adopted, such as the new election 
law, the unbundling of Naftogaz and the lifting 
of the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land 
(which may positively and permanently change 
Ukraine’s political and economic life). Even though 
the adopted model of governing the country has 
proved rather ineffective given the opportunities 
offered by the scope of power secured, it appears 
that a gradual shift from the concept of ‘new 
faces’ in the staffing policy will be continued. 
Deoligarchisation should not be expected but 
rather further attempts to involve the oligarchs 
in the state’s actions, which would consequen-
tly lead to an enhanced role for several of them, 
above all Akhmetov. Maintaining the unity of the 
ruling party in the parliament and the local elec-
tions scheduled for October this year will present 
a challenge for Zelensky and his allies. To date, the 
Servant of the People party has not made efforts 
to develop its structures in the regions and the 
governors of oblasts appointed by the president 
have a weak position, particularly in the wealthy 
oblasts of Kharkiv and Odessa and this may further 
exacerbate tensions in their relations with Kyiv. 
As for the institutions responsible for the country’s 
security and the rule of law, their stability will 
depend on the president’s ability to limit his own 
ambitions and to move away from frequent re-
shuffles and attempts to use them instrumentally 
in the ongoing political fight. Countering Russia’s 
destructive activity remains a challenge of key 
importance. Moscow will continue to undertake 
military and non-military destabilising actions 
with the long-term goal of forcing Ukraine’s elites 
to recognise its political and economic interests. 
This will result in the political domination of the 
country. Kyiv will continue to seek a breakthro-
ugh in the talks on the Donbas, thus confirming 
Zelensky’s genuine desire to bring about peace, 
even though it cannot be ruled out that he will 
switch to a contingency (albeit enigmatic) plan.
The economic implications of the COVID-19 pan-
demic will constitute the main challenge for the 
president. At present it is difficult to foresee how 
deeply Ukraine will be affected. The International 
Monetary Fund forecasts that Ukraine’s GDP will 
fall by 7.7% this year. However, past experience 
compels us to expect a larger decline, in particular 
given that the economy contracted by 1.5% in 
the first quarter of this year, before the lockdown 
was introduced.
